Let\'s Review
Hey Darby,
Because you and I both know that analysts work in pairs, I figured I would go through a brief summary review of our OETWO'er. Please tell me if you think I have anything wrong in my analysis. We start with her first post, and I will provide select quotes as she proceeded:
Hello. My name is Lyndzee Grummond. I am a citizen of the State of Virginia and government employee working in the Pentagon in the year 2024.
She is a government employee, working in the Pentagon, and yet somehow she wishes people to believe that she is also working for/under some fictional ITI in cooperation with Europe and Japan. At the same time she wants people to believe she is either exempt from, or only partially bound by security agreements (and by partially-bound it is clear she makes up her own rules of security since she has exhibited violation of common security processes).
I will try my best to answer your questions in full and in detail. Unfortunately, I am unable to give you great specifics regarding the technology with which we are able to travel because it is a security issue.
In this quote, from her second post, she admits that "great specifics" regarding the technology represent a "security issue." Yet later in her arguments here, now she is trying to claim that <font color="red"> "OPSEC and INFOSEC do not apply here." [/COLOR] Interesting, yes? She has security issues that prevent her from telling us "some things", but amazingly OpSec and InfoSec do not apply here. How do you read that, Darby? We continue with her words from her second post:
I can tell you that to this point there have been great strides in time travel technology, however because of the potential negatives in obtaining it, it is kept as confidential as possible.
OK. Well if we are to keep it "as confidential as possible", then this would certainly imply TOP SECRET, as a minimum. There may be (and likely would be) additional security classifications attached to this that would modify a TOP SECRET classification rating. So here we see a CLEAR VIOLATION of the "neither confirm nor deny" rule, which even applies to information below TOP SECRET. Again, Darby, do you find an error in my analysis?
Also, I can reveal that the technology we are currently using is a joint effort of the United States, the EU and Japan.
Once again, here we see a clear violation of security rules in mentioning allied countries that are involved with technology that she, herself, has said has a "security issue" and that is "kept as confidential as possible" (TOP SECRET). If my analysis is correct (again, I am asking you to check me Darby), then we should understand why I made the statement that if she really was who she claimed she was, that I would be bound to report her actions to the DoD. Of course, if I can detect that she is NOT who she claims she is, then all I would have to do is report her as impersonating a government employee. Right? We continue:
Regarding my background, I am one of two "Co-Directors" of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency under the Department of Defense.
She claims to be a "Co-Director" of DARPA even though such a title does not exist, and we understand why "co-anything" titles are troublesome in a military agency. Now she does not identify at what level she is "Co-Director", but there is certainly no "Co-Director" nor even a "Co-Deputy Director".
Once again, my mission is here is to observe and to collect some information which I cannot go into further detail on other than to say it is regarding a foreign country.
OpSec violation.
As of now there are only two "time machines" in the world. One is located in Virginia and the other is located in Brussels.
Again, OpSec violation. She clearly told us there are security issues, and it is kept "as confidential as possible", but then she reveals locations where equipment is kept.
The creation of the organization was led by the United States, followed by the joining of Japan and the European Union (under the directive of the UK, France, Switzerland, Belgium and Germany).
Clearly, if the USA leads a technologica development that involves its own DoD interacting with other countries, then OpSec is required.
I apologize, but I am unable to post pictures of any type. This type of interaction has not been cleared by the ITI.
Here we see a statement from her that, for anyone who understand the DoD and how it applies security, clearly shows us that OpSec processes are indeed being applied to her project. If, as she claimed, that "OpSec does not apply here" then there would be no OpSec evaluation that would have lead to identifying this "interaction" as critical information.
I wouldn't say that I "do not answer" to the Defense Secretary, I do report to him
Here she appears to clarify that her position could not be a "Co-Deputy Director" for such a person (if the title existed, which it does not) would only report to the DARPA Director. Hence, she must be claiming to be a "Co-Director" with someone else that would both report to the Secretary of Defense. Interesting, don't you think, how basic command principles must have changed to allow such sloppy reporting hierarchies... in the DoD of all places?
What do you think so far, Darby?
RMT
