Black Box Voting - The End of Democracy?

Re: Voting Problems Appear Early - USAToday.com

Cig,

How do you know one of my names is... Joseph? (Middle name prefer "J" actually)
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You mean you've forgotten already? Guess the memory is one of the first things to go as you get old. :)

I believe your "tracking" and "engagement" of me is part of your JOB.
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Your belief is wrong. But someone as wrapped-up in conspiracy theories as you seem to be would, of course, never believe this truth.

Why would one of lets say DARPAs top engineers have a "hobby" of "arguing" with me.
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I do not work directly for DARPA. I work for Northrop-Grumman Corporation. And the answer to your "why" question? I guess this again shows your ignorance of the typical engineering process. Engineers cannot just sit and totally focus on a problem all day. It is a bit like the way your eye works... your best vision is not achieved by looking straight at something, but off-angle. In engineering we call it "diversionary thought" when trying to solve a problem. Most often, the solution to difficult engineering problems is arrived at while thinking about something else (with the problem in the background of your mind). In fact, I have solved some of my most difficult problems: On the surfboard catching a wave, in the Sierras catching a fish, in the pub catching a babe...etc. :)

And so, as to your question that you have asked that just seems to be tormenting you, let me answer in this way: As with every employer, my employer tracks ALL web activity. Thus, of course my employer knows what I do on the internet while at work. That is because they understand "diversionary thought". When you turn out complex control systems like I do, I haven't seen them complaining. In fact, they also know that I teach at a local university, and they also know that I help engineering students on a couple of forums elsewhere on the internet. In fact, I am also helping the CalTech team entering the next DARPA Grand Challenge with their systems engineering. Extracurricular activities are not frowned upon at my job, especially if they keep me sharp and productive! ;)

Why do I feel I being watched? investigated? and compiled?
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Ummmmmm...... Paranoia? That would be my first Dx! :)

I think whole "simulator technician" and "flight controls" engineer thing is a 'cover'.
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I am NOT a "simulator technician". That would be a serious demotion for any engineer (a technician is a person without a degree in design engineering). Rather, a simulator is something I design, or a tool I use to evaluate my aircraft control law designs. It would help you to learn more depth about my trade before you rush to judgments.

Your IP doesn't give a 'domain' just a town. Interesting.
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If you are going to judge my intentions based on things that are totally beyond my control (such as how my ISP or my company's IP shows up) you can come to all sorts of wild & wacky conclusions.

In fact, I believe if you put my "home" IP (71.105.167.50) into the following IP locator it will give you more than just my location. And if you put my work IP (157.127.124.15) into the same tool, it will also tell you more than just location...

http://www.maxmind.com/app/locate_ip

Man, technology is REALLY great... provided you know how to use it! :)

I have nothing to hide, despite your continued paranoia that you think you are so important that I am paid to watch you (or defeat you!) :) I WISH I could get a gig like that for the Benjamins I make! That would be a HELLUVA lot of fun for some good coin! :)

RMT
 
Re: Voting Problems Appear Early - USAToday.com

"I do not work directly for DARPA. I work for Northrop-Grumman Corporation.
As with every employer, my employer tracks ALL web activity."

My lawyer will find this most helpful... :)

"I guess this again shows your ignorance of the typical engineering process."

I design 'stuff' that works the first time RMT :) I don't hide behind an 'engineering culture' like you do... Not that I'm what is considered an 'engineer' in the first place. And no one cares you're an engineer here but you :)

"In engineering we call it "diversionary thought" when trying to solve a problem."

Is that what government contractors call "loafing" Design a part 1 month spend 10 years doing testing... You crack me up... :)

"I have nothing to hide, despite your continued paranoia that you think you are so important that I am paid to watch you (or defeat you!) :)
I WISH I could get a gig like that for the Benjamins I make! That would be a HELLUVA lot of fun for some good coin! :)"

"you are so important"
Awww... You don't think so? :)

I'm not convinced... Considering the time and effort you spend here... Still sounds like you're getting paid for your time at TTI... There is no such thing as "paranoia" only a heightened state of awareness :)

I'm curious about something... Who was here first? Me? or You?

TheCigMan

Vigilance!
 
Re: Voting Problems Appear Early - USAToday.com

RMT,

You wouldn't happen to be working for the...

Security and Intelligence
Security and Intelligence Directorate
The Security and Intelligence Directorate plans, executes, and directs the information, personnel, industrial and physical security programs at DARPA and at specified contractor sites. This includes declassification management activities, the security classification management program, and the Communications Security Program (COMSEC). S&ID also formulates and implements security policy and procedures at DARPA and represents DARPA on security matters with external organizations.

The Information Processing Technology Office focuses on inventing the networking, computing, and software technologies vital to ensuring DOD military superiority.
http://www.darpa.mil/body/darpaoff.html

I'm even more convinced you're a DARPA SPOOK. :)

TheCigMan
 
Re: Voting Problems Appear Early - USAToday.com

I'm not convinced...
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You make the error (again) of thinking I am trying to convince you. I am simply telling you the truth (which I always do). You don't accept the truth? That's your deal, not mine. :)

I'm curious about something... Who was here first? Me? or You?
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That depends on just how good a "detective" you are. I was here (anon) well before my reg date of this username. Even posted a reply or two to "Mr. Titor". I think Darby might know what my handle was at that Time, but being the "spook" you make me out to be, why would I volunteer that info? :)

RMT
 
Re: Voting Problems Appear Early - USAToday.com

You wouldn't happen to be working for the...

Security and Intelligence
Security and Intelligence Directorate
Click to expand...

No.

I'm even more convinced you're a DARPA SPOOK.
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Well, that is just wonderful. If nothing else it makes it more fun for me. BOO! :)

But I guess that since you (who is so smart, so cunning, so elite) think I am a spook, I guess that means if I applied to the CIA they might take me straight away! :) I've heard they have some great on-the-job travel programs! ;)

RMT
 
Re: Voting Problems Appear Early - USAToday.com

RMT,

Regarding "I'm curious about something... Who was here first? Me? or You?"

You registered on 12/23/03 12:29 PM

I registered TheCigSmokingMan on 12/20/03 10:57 PM

I posted the message on 12/20 ----------------------------------------------------
http://www.timetravelinstitute.com/...osts&Main=15667&Search=true#Post15667
The 'Tell' John Titor is a fake...
12/20/03 11:08 PM (172.131.212.98)
An obvious tell that John Titor is the times he was posting. If one looks closely at the times, it shows he is an office worker of some kind - manager, programmer or engineer.

The majority of the postings are just before 9, at lunch times or from 3:30-5:00.

These times are the principle 'goof-off' times in an office environment.

Admittedly, they are some late night postings but these are out the main pattern.

Why would a time traveler be at work?
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Why did the TheCigSmokingMan's post cause RMT to register

Why would RMT be concerned with "The 'Tell' John Titor is a fake..."

Is RMT Titor? Mmmmm An office goof off? They have so much in common...

Or just your Military Industrial Complex spy?

Was Titor an excercise in Social Programming by MIC? To Support Republican's Project For New American Century? To make MORE WEAPONS to support that cause? and THEREBY PROFIT

Is this why RMT gets so mad at TT hoaxers? Because he is the greatest HOAXER OF ALL TIME.

Debunking (and watching) on his own HOAX - Titor

I think you've all been had...


TheCigMan
 
California Report Slams E-Voting System Security

California Report Slams E-Voting System Security
Researchers commissioned by California have found security issues in every electronic voting system they tested, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen said today.

http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,135199-c,techindustrytrends/article.html

Robert McMillan, IDG News Service
Friday, July 27, 2007 4:00 PM PDT

Researchers commissioned by the State of California have found security issues in every electronic voting system they tested, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen said Friday.

The report was published Friday as part of a complete review of the state's e-voting systems initiated earlier this year by Bowen's office.

Its findings were not encouraging for backers of e-voting.

"The security teams were able to bypass both physical and software security in every system they tested," Bowen said Friday during a conference call with media.

Bowen is set to decide by Aug. 3 which systems will be certified for use in the 2008 presidential primaries. She declined to comment on how the report's findings will affect this decision until she has completely reviewed the report. "The severity of it, what it means ... that's a matter for us to investigate and pull apart and analyze between now and next Friday."

But she did acknowledge that the security problems found by researchers were important. "It's a big deal for many people in this country," she said. "We are a democracy and our very existence as a democracy is dependent on having voting systems that are secure, reliable and accurate."

California's review is the most thorough review of voting machine technology yet undertaken in the U.S.

A team of researchers assembled by the University of California has spent the past two months evaluating the security, accessibility and manufacturer documentation of voting machines. A "red team" of penetration testers attempted to gain access to the voting systems to see if they could disrupt an election or alter the results, while another team examined the source code to the machines.

Researchers examined devices manufactured by Diebold Election Systems Inc., Hart InterCivic Inc. and Sequoia Voting Systems Inc.

Another vendor, Election Systems & Software Inc. (ES&S) was so late in providing access to their products that their systems will be evaluated at a later date, Bowen said.

The ES&S systems are used by Los Angeles County, and Bowen wouldn't say whether the absence of ES&S from the report might leave the county without certified voting systems in February.

Voting systems are purchased by local county officials in California, but they must be certified by the Secretary of State's office before they can be used in an election.

With California on the forefront of voting system reforms, the report will be closely scrutinized by state officials across the country, said Kim Alexander, president and founder of the California Voter Foundation. "Even though we've made a number of improvements to voting systems in California, doubts persist about the reliability of our voting equipment."

In 2004, for example, voting was delayed by several hours in many San Diego precincts as the city struggled to roll out a new US$31 million Diebold electronic voting system.

The report was conducted under added time constraints. In March, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger moved the date of the state's 2008 presidential primary vote ahead from June to February 5.

State law mandates that the Secretary of State must give counties at least six months' notice if machines are to be de-certified, forcing Bowen to make a decision on the matter by August 3.

She said Friday that it was unfortunate there was not more time for study and debate, but that putting off the review was not an option. "I don't want any doubt about the reliability of our voting systems come February 5, 2008," she said.

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Here is one for RainmanTime... His own state verifies the concern about e-voting machines...

Too bad he isn't talking to me anymore... :)

TheCigMan
 
E-voting Triad Objects to Voting Machine Criticism

E-voting Triad Objects to Voting Machine Criticisms
Criticizing the criticisms in an ongoing e-voting saga

http://www.dailytech.com/Evoting+Triad+Objects+to+Voting+Machine+Criticisms/article8246.htm

Representatives from three voting machine companies expressed their criticisms against a California state-sponsored “top-to-bottom review” that found “very real” vulnerabilities in their products.
The study was lead by UC Davis professor Matt Bishop, who discussed the study at a hearing held by Secretary of State Debra Bowen, whose office is currently deciding whether or not to allow the machines’ use during the Feb. 5 presidential primary.

Under a contract with UC Davis and Bowen’s office, Bishop’s study examined machines from Diebold Election Systems, Hart Intercivic, and Sequoia Voting Systems. The conclusions, partially released last week, included findings that the voting systems posed difficulties for voters with disabilities and were vulnerable to intrusion. "It may be that all of [the vulnerabilities] can be protected against. It may be that some cannot,” said Bishop. According to Secretary Bowen, a fourth company, Election Systems & Software, was also to be included in the review but was omitted because it was late in providing needed information to her office.

According to state law, Bowen has until Friday to set the rules for the upcoming primary election. "I intend to go through a methodical process to determine what to do next," she said.

Sequoia Systems, in a statement released Monday on their web site, called the study’s findings “implausible,” objecting to the fact that the study was conducted in a closed lab environment over a period of weeks as opposed to a true election environment or in accordance with ISO criteria. “None of the attacks described … are capable of success,” said Sequoia sales executive Steven Bennett to a panel of officials from the Secretary of State’s office.

Diebold and Sequoia further pointed out that the study evaluated outdated versions of the voting machines and their software. “While it cannot be guaranteed that all of the extremely improbable vulnerabilities identified are prevented by subsequent product development and updates, many are specifically addressed,” said Sequoia. However, Sequoia acknowledged that it is working to insure that the “few system vulnerabilities” found could not be used to tamper with election results.

“Voting system reliability is something we're always working at improving … security is never finished,” said Sequoia spokeswoman Michelle Schafer.

Hart Intercivic also objected to the study’s laboratory environment, stressing it was not a considerable substitute for real-world “people, processes, procedures, policies, and technology” and, in the company’s official statement, suggested that a better study might “define a realistic threat that faces all layers of security in an election.”

Even members of the security community have questioned the study’s approach: “While the goals of this effort were laudable, our organization is concerned about its execution,” writes Jim March of watchdog group Black Box Voting, to Secretary Bowen. “Your agency's review only partially examines the risks of inside manipulation with these systems. Procedural remedies can be circumvented by those with some level of inside access. In fact, we would contend that the most high risk scenario of all is that of inside manipulation, and we would also contend that the systems used in California cannot be secured from inside tampering.”

Since their inception, voting machines in the US have received a bad rap amidst a storm of negative press, mishaps, and concern about their ability to be tampered with:

In September 2006, Princeton researchers were able to hack Diebold’s AccuVote-TS machine, going so far as to write a computer virus that spread between other Diebold machines. Later, voting machines from Sequoia were also found to have similar vulnerabilities. “You can’t detect it,” explained Princeton Professor Andrew Appel.

In the same month, a team of untrained 54-year-old women from Black Box Voting, using 4 minutes’ worth of time and $12 in tools, were able to circumvent tamper-proof seals on a Diebold vote scanner, and were able to replace the device’s memory card.

Also in September 2006, a consulting firm working for Ohio’s Cuyahoga County -- which includes Cleveland -- found huge discrepancies between the electronic and paper records kept by Diebold voting machines. Ohio was a key swing state for the tight 2004 presidential election, and its electoral votes help decide the result.

Earlier that year in August, Diebold voting machines botched the Alaska preliminaries in several precincts as they failed to connect to their dial-up servers to upload vote results, slowing the election considerably. Officials had to hand-count votes and manually upload the totals to the central server.

In December 2005, a Diebold whistleblower under the name of “Dieb-throat,” who was once a “staunch supporter of electronic voting’s potential” gave a scathing interview to The Raw Story accusing Diebold of mismanagement and burying known backdoors in their own products, including one that made the Department of Homeland Security’s National Cyber Alert System for the first week of September 2004.

In 2004, Black Box Voting released a video demonstrating that a chimp, given an hour of training, was able to hack a Diebold voting machine. “What you saw was a staged production ... analogous to a magic show,” said Diebold spokesman David Bear, in response.

These findings, as well as others both negative and positive, culminated in a March 2007 warning from the US Government Audit Office as it testified before the Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government: “[E-voting] security and reliability concerns are legitimate and thus merit the combined and focused attention of federal, state, and local authorities responsible for election administration.”

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E-Voting hacking is impossible!!! :) lol So funny.... :)

TheCigMan
 
Diebold e-voting flaws could compromise elections

Diebold e-voting flaws could compromise elections
Vendor must must fix optical scan machines by mid-August, say Florida officials

http://www.computerworld.com/action...asic&articleId=9028626&intsrc=hm_list

August 01, 2007 (Computerworld) --

Optical scan voting devices slated to be used in presidential primary elections in Florida next year are significantly flawed and could compromise the outcome of the contest, according to a report released yesterday by Secretary of State Kurt Browning.

The report (download PDF) was compiled by researchers at Florida State University who were hired by Browning in May to conduct an independent review of optical scan and touch-screen devices made by Diebold Election Systems, one of the largest voting machine vendors in the country and a major supplier of gear to Florida.

The report cited a number of security gaps in the Diebold systems.

For example, it said, Diebold's Accuvote OS optical scan machine is vulnerable to vote manipulation by illicitly inserting a preprogrammed memory card into a voting terminal. The report said that the card could be coded to flip votes from one candidate to another without detection.

In a letter (download PDF) sent to Diebold Election Systems President David Byrd on Tuesday, Browning said that the vulnerabilities cited in the report must be fixed by Aug. 17 or the vendor's certification would be denied.

Browning cited a number of changes that must be made, including security upgrades that would prevent the surreptitious insertion of preloaded memory cards.

This was a fairly routine test of a new version of the optical scan system, said Mark Radke, director of marketing at Allen, Texas-based Diebold.

This is a way for the state to proactively catch and address any security issues. "We have received the summary," Radke said. "There are a few items to tighten as far as security goes, and those are being developed. These are minor changes to the system, and we expect those changes to be submitted by the August deadline."

A spokesman for Browning stated on Wednesday that Diebold had made assurances that the flaws would be addressed and that he was confident the vendor would in fact do so. And, as some of the problems have to do with voting processes, not technology, Browning would issue special advisories to election officials to address those procedural gaps.

Browning also said he intends to have the Florida State researchers conduct similar studies of machines from other voting system vendors, including Elections Systems & Software Inc. "We expect all voting systems to be certified and complete by the end of the year," he said.

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Maybe there is hope for democracy...

TheCigMan
 
Electronic voting systems decertified in Ca

Electronic voting systems decertified
Paul Wellersdick
Article Launched: 08/07/2007 01:00:00 AM PDT

http://www.paradisepost.com/ci_6557637?source=most_viewed

California Secretary of State decided Friday to decertify electronic voting systems for use in California and unless the manufacturers of the systems and the counties using them adopt higher security measures, the systems won't be allowed.
The systems were tested in a laboratory setting by the University of California, Davis. They were given a month to figure out problems in the machines and report their findings to the secretary. The UC students and faculty found weaknesses and Bowen made her decision, one that may cost Butte County.

Butte County has used a Direct Recording Electronic system from Diebold Election Systems in the past. But Diebold's DREs have been decertified. The DRE will only be recertified to allow one machine for early voting and to provide disability access requirements from the Help America Vote Act.

Secretary Bowen said that her job, as chief elections officer, was to make sure votes were accurately cast.

"The systems we use to cast and tally votes in this state are the most fundamental tools of our democracy," she said. "My decisions have a bias towards voting systems that score the highest with two very important measuring sticks: transparency and auditability.

Applying proper auditing procedures to optical scan systems that are easier for voters to see and understand gives us the ability to begin rebuilding the voter confidence in the systems we use to conduct elections."

She is aware her decision affects others, Bowen said.

"I'm mindful of the impact these decisions will have on voters, on county local elections officials, poll workers, voting system vendors and on others in California and across the nation," she said. "However, it's important to remember that in last November's election, at least two-thirds, and probably closer to 75 percent, of the 8.9 million voters who cast ballots did so using a paper absentee ballot or a paper optical scan ballot."

Bowen is confident in her decision because it followed a "top to bottom review." But not everyone shares her enthusiasm and confidence.

Candace Grubbs, Butte County clerk recorder/registrar of voters said the review was misleading and she needs time to review the secretary's mandates before she'll know how much the county will have to spend fixing problems that only existed in the lab testing environments.

Bowen has required the counties to electronically send election results to her, Grubbs said that is a weakness, not identified by lab tests.

"The one system never tested is hers," she said.

The county spent $197 million in Proposition 41 money and HAVA money to move to electronic voting. Now Bowen decertified these DREs, Grubbs said.

"Prop 41 was bond money, what a waste of tax payers' money," she said.

Election costs have already risen and the additional costs that may result from Bowen's decision would trickle down to schools and other tax payer supported areas, she said.

Because Bowen didn't make her decision until 11:50 pm Friday, Grubbs won't know until next week exactly how Butte County will be affected, Grubbs said.

Diebold hasn't been silent about the secretary's stand either.

"We are disappointed that Secretary Bowen has taken action to severely limit the options available to local election officials and voters in California," said Dave Byrd, President, Diebold Election Systems.

The DREs Diebold makes are accurate, Byrd said.

"One hundred and twenty six thousand DESI touch screen voting solutions were used successfully across the country in November 2006. DESI's touch screen voting solutions have been proven 100 percent accurate in tests conducted on Election Day in California and across the country," he said.

The testing procedures for the DREs were faulty and didn't take into consideration new upgrades from Diebold, Byrd said.

"Secretary Bowen's top-to-bottom review was designed to ignore security procedures and protocols that are used during every election," he said.

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Maybe this will start a trend across the country...

Oh Rainy! Where are you?!!! :)

TheCigMan
 
Securing (Or Not) Your Right to Vote

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20546322/site/newsweek/page/2/

By Steven Levy

Newsweek

Sept. 10, 2007 issue - Next year we'll have the second presidential election since the horribly botched one in 2000. Can we expect better? An answer comes from the highest election official in the most populated state in the Union. Worried about a string of reported vulnerabilities, Debra Bowen, California's secretary of State, had asked computer scientists at the University of California to conduct a "top to bottom" analysis of the thousands of touchscreen electronic voting machines in use in the Golden State. Next year millions of voters will use these systems, manufactured by the industry's largest suppliers, not only in California but in many other states as well.

What did the study reveal? "Things were worse than I thought," says Bowen. "There were far too many ways that people with ill intentions could compromise the voting systems without detection." Some of those security holes could, in theory, allow a dirty trickster with access to a single machine to infiltrate the central vote-counting system and covertly toss an election to the wrong candidate.

It was the most devastating confirmation to date of what security experts have been saying for years: vulnerabilities in election machines are so severe that voters have no way of knowing for sure that the choices they enter into the touchscreens and ballots will actually be counted. "The studies show that these machines are basically poison," says Avi Rubin, a Johns Hopkins computer-science professor and voting-security expert.

Bowen's response, on Aug. 3, was to take the extreme step of decertifying the voting machines (this to the dismay of those defending the touchscreen vendors, who claimed that the tests did not reflect real-world conditions). Because California voters do need something to vote on, though, she allowed the use of some, mandating a rigorous set of controls (like "hardening" the security protocols) to make sure that the flaws aren't exploited. Now it's up to those in charge of elections in other states to step up and take similar measures for 2008.

One desperately needed measure is a national law to implement what is known as a voting paper trail—the ballot equivalent of a receipt in a cash register. (Voters get to look at a printout of their voting choices and leave the paper behind for recounts and audits.) A "voting integrity" bill introduced by Rep. Rush Holt, a New Jersey Democrat, would do just that—if it ever passes. "We just didn't get it to the floor before the August recess," says Holt, who is hoping for what seems like a long shot—that the bill will be quickly voted on, a similar bill in the Senate will also get the hurry-up treatment and that the president will sign it. (The GOP has generally been less active in pushing for this type of reform.) "It's still possible [to get it done in time for '08], but each day it gets a little less possible," he says.

The paper trail is no panacea: the California study shows that even that system can be hacked. And some reformers claim that the Holt bill doesn't go far enough. But Holt insists that a national law is the only solution. "If you leave it to the states, some won't do it," he says.

It's reasonable to ask why the same wizards who can come up with ATMs, predator drones and Google can't produce secure, verifiable ballots. Eventually they will, if we encourage innovation, transparency and accountability in the ballot industry. But we're electing a new president next year, and it's so late in the game that the only measures to stop another mistrusted election are stopgaps. California's secretary of State recognizes that. Plenty of citizens get it, too. Why aren't more elected officials standing up for our elections?

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The only SECURE verifiable option is PAPER BALLOTS! :)

TheCigMan
 
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