The reason I asked that;
Anyone take a stab at what year approx "potential (your mass)" was accepted into physics circles as mentioned above?
'Was for a very surprising fact I came across reading some
old theological texts predating most modern theology and sciences.
Let it be stated before I proceed that I am not biased for or
agaisnt a church, or certain denomination with any agenda,
except to learn from every facet without prejudice.
Sometimes that tends to take us back to the roots I find.
At any rate, the work I'm speaking of is;
"Summa Theologica" Written by Saint Thomas Aquinas
Written 1265 - 1274
I was expecting to open it, and much like my copy of the Witches Hammer,
soon find great disinerest in the communications of the time for
modern relevance.
Wow was I blown away. All I can say, is that some things
are lost along the way.
I understand now why in the least the man was highly regarded,
to the point of a Saint.
Even just on the lvl of thought and expression.
Keep this in mind, 1265 - 1274...St. Thomas himself was born in the year 1225.
Speaking of passion,
this nine year work did not end because of reaching
a final chapter upon investigation...
Saint Thomas passed away 1274.
Now with that in mind,
what am I getting at?
Without offending anyone please overlook the theological connotations
for just a moment and read further into the understanding of sciences
in this enigmas thoughts. I will copy/paste some excerpts that pertain
to the original point.
Here we find he explores the potential of matter to reflect
the qualities of God.
Quite a bit so. He also speaks of Theology in terms of metaphysics and science,
something rarely heard in todays age. Fascinating.
Add that to the fact he was considered a proponent of animism in his ideology, and wow.
For the non-religious that have bias agaisnt organized religion,
for the exemplification of my point, does this man not think like a scientist or physicist?
I'd like you, the reader to keep in mind - how many theological texts from the
1200's etc sound like a physics lesson?
Enough of my rambling, you decide.
"Whether or not it can be proven God exists"
Page 11.
Objection 1.
It seems that the existence of God cannot
be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists.
But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration
produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the
unseen (Heb. 11:1). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that
God exists.
Answer to objection 1.
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion.
It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world
some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put
in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is
in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a
thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else
than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.
But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality,
except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is
actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be
actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not
possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and
potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects.
For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially
hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible
that in the same respect and in the same way a thing
should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself.
Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion
by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put
in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another,
and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity,
because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently,
no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move
only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as
the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand.
Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion
by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In
the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes.
There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which
a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would
be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it
is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes
following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate
cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause,
whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now
to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if
there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no
ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes
it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient
cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate
efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it
is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone
gives the name of God.
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and
runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and
not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt,
and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be.
But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is
possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything
is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been
nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there
would be nothing in existence, because that which does not
exist only begins to exist by something already existing. erefore,
if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been
impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even
now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd. erefore,
not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist
something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary
thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not.
Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things
which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already
proved in regard to efficient causes. erefore we cannot
but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its
own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather
causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in
things. Among beings there are some more and some less good,
true, noble and the like. But “more†and “less†are predicated
of different things, according as they resemble in their different
ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to
be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is
hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something
best, something noblest and, consequently, something which
is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are
greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum
in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which
is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. erefore
there must also be something which is to all beings the cause
of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this
we call God.
Sounding anything like Plato, Socrates, even Newtonian philosophy/speculations?
(keep in mind this man existed 500 years approx before Newton).
Whether God is infinite?
Page 31
Objection 1.
It seems that God is not infinite. For everything
infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it
has parts and matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most
perfect; therefore He is not infinite.
Objection 2.
Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys.
i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity
in God, for He is not a body, as was shown above (q. 3,
a. 1). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite.
Objection 3.
Further, what is here in such a way as not to
be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which
is a thing in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according
to substance. But God is this, and not another; for He
is not a stone or wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.
I answer that, All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude
to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with
reason; for they considered that things flow forth infinitely
from the first principle. But because some erred concerning the
nature of the first principle, as a consequence they erred also
concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they asserted that matter
was the first principle; consequently they attributed to the
first principle a material infinity to the effect that some infinite
body was the first principle of things.
We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite
because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by
form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by
form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in potentiality
to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated
by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch
as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but
when received in matter, the form is determined to this one
particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which
it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter, has
the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless
matter. On the other hand, form is not made perfect by matter,
but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded
on the part of the form not determined by matter, has
the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal
of all things, as appears from what is shown above (q. 4, a. 1,
obj. 3). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received
in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was shown
above (q. 3, a. 4), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and
perfect.
From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2.
Quantity is terminated by its form,
which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in
quantity terminated, is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the
infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite
cannot be attributed to God; as was said above, in this
article.
Reply to Objection 3.
The fact that the being of God is
self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite,
shows Him to be distinguished from all other beings,
and all others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a
thing as a self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not
exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other
whiteness existing in a subject.
-----------------------------------------------------
Theology aside...
Would you consider this Saint a philosophist in physics for living
during the 1200's and putting so much evidence into being, cause/effect, etc?
Most texts I've read written after this period held up by the church use
fear, faith, and outright
that's just the way it is in fear of heresy arguements....
Think about it, the Inquisition hadn't even been thought of yet (that I am aware).
This is predating alot of politics or during
(the crusades etc).
The entire volume is written like this.
To me it sounds like he would have loved to work in a wind tunnel with RMT and chew the fat lol.
Saint Thomas Aquinas, the forgotten metaphysics philosophist that pondered physics most of his life in answers to the riddles of existence?
Would anyone agree, disagree?
Fascinating, either way.
As regards relative things, we must admit
extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated “placedâ€
from “place,†and “measured†from “measure.†But as regards
absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate
ideas (q. 84, a. 4) of all things, and that individuals were
denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for
instance, that Socrates is called man according to the separate
idea of man. Now just as he laid down separate ideas of man
and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse,
so likewise he laid down separate ideas of “being†and of “one,â€
and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by
participation of these, everything was called “being†or “oneâ€;
Any thoughts from a non-theological point of view?