To add onto and expand my previous reply, I greatly believe that consiousness and sub-consiousness (i.e. dream state)can be individually or collectively manipulated to affect a method of time travel. We as a collective (no Borg intended)should take the lead in developing methodology to actually 'do rather than dream about' put time travel in a reality mode. We need to collect our thoughts, theories, assets and skills, and make things happen. I have also included some other information from Part 5 of my latest book below. As you will note, there are other resourses at work looking as the same or similar aspects as I and you do. I don't want to be the 'last one through the door'.
The following may be hot and deep for some, but try and take the time to read and discuss. I think you will continue to find my studies interesting.
Part 5 (cont.)
1.3.1 The Physical and Philosophical Assessment
The problem of the nature of consciousness, the so-called "hard problem" requires for its solution contributions from many disciplines. These involve topics in philosophy, physics, neurophysiology, and psychology, among others. As a result, the quantum theory of consciousness has had to cover a wide range of subjects that have appeared in widely separated publications. These sources of basic material that develop the overall topic have not been adequately brought together so as to show how the several themes fit together. The purpose here is to outline this theory, and show how these themes fit together.
The problem of the nature of consciousness has been the central theme of philosophy for some four centuries. Despite these centuries of effort, little progress has been made. Philosophy has singled out alternatives: "monistic" theories and "dualistic" possibilities, but philosophy has provided no resolution of the basic question about the nature of consciousness. For us today, concerned with the scientific problem of explaining the nature of consciousness, these philosophical options of monism and dualism translate into the possibility that consciousness is either simply an aspect of brain functioning, or that in addition to the brain as such, there is something that is extra-physical, something that is mind-like, over and above the strictly physical nature of the brain.
It is essential for us to have a resolution of this long-standing problem so that a starting point for the scientific study of consciousness can be established. Unless this basic problem is resolved, it is unlikely that there can be any significant scientific resolution of the consciousness problem.
Fortunately, despite the long history of this controversy, it is now possible to resolve the problem. This can be accomplished by means of an argument of about seven statements:
(1) The science of physics defines for us what is meant by the term physical reality.
(2) Physics is based on data from physical measurements.
(3) Anything that cannot be physically measured is treated in physics as not having physical reality. Note in this regard that the major advances of 20th century physics -relativity, quantum mechanics, particle physics, and quantum thermodynamics, have all come from recognizing this subtle limitation that exists on the nature of physical measurement and physical reality.
(4) Therefore, if it is not possible to physically measure something, then it either does not exist, or we must treat it as being nonphysical.
(5) There exists something that, under certain circumstances, we experience and call pain (quite apart from any theory of consciousness, this is our basic datum).
(6) It is impossible to carry out any physical measurement to determine the answer to the meaningful (albeit facetious) question: Does an ice cube feel pain when it melts?
<I.e., does any given physical system have an associated conscious experience when that system undergoes any specified physical process?>
(7) Therefore, since the conscious experience of feeling pain exists (quite apart from any ability on our part to account for its nature), but cannot be physically measured (although so-called correlates of it can be measured), the consciousness of things like pain must lie outside the domain of physically reality.
As a result of this we can assert the following postulate:
1.3.2 Consciousness is Real but Non-Physical
The fact that consciousness is one part of this duality mirrors the fact that physics is, itself, already dualistic. This dualism is the basis of what is known in physics as the "measurement problem," an issue related to the existence of consciousness, but an issue that goes outside the present discussion.
The fact that consciousness is real, but nonphysical impacts on the approach we must take in order to understand its nature. Were consciousness strictly a property of physical processes, then the development of a science of consciousness would begin by concentrating on the question of the neurophysiological correlates of consciousness. But that is not the nature of consciousness, as we have just seen. Instead, consciousness is "dualistic" in its relationship to physical processes. With this assumption that consciousness and matter relate on a dualistic basis, it is clear that the study must begin with the question as to the nature of the interface between physical processes and consciousness. (This question, in fact, has always been the basic sticking point hindering the introduction of dualism.) That is to say, we have to begin by determining what physically fundamental process serves to connect physical reality to the stream of conscious experience. We are, after all, largely, if not entirely, conscious of things that go on in the physical world, things that are physically measurable. In stating the issue in this way, we have to recognize that:
Consciousness is connected to physical reality by one physically fundamental construct.
where we have used Occam's razor to limit us to one physically fundamental construct for this connection.
1.3.4 The Physics of Consciousness
Because of the postulates cited above, the first problem that has to be addressed about the nature of consciousness has to do with the connection between the nonphysical consciousness and the phenomenological world described by physics. Fortunately, physics has progressed sufficiently that this problem can be readily addressed. The fundamental equations adequately describe the physical phenomena that could be involved in the brain functions that support our own human consciousness with which we have immediate knowledge and experience. The second of the above postulates would require that consciousness be associated with one of the constructs, or quantities, that underlie these equations.
Thus, we can say that consciousness must be associated with one of the following:
(1) Mass. (2) Space and/or time. (3) Individual elementary particles.
(4) One of the four fundamental forces.
a. Gravity/gravitation. b. Electromagnetism.
c. Nuclear forces (sic. chromodynamics). d. Weak force.
(5) Totality of everything in the basic equations of physics.
(6) The state vector Y <please read Greek psi> in quantum mechanics.
It is not necessary for us to go over all of these here; they have been dealt with in detail elsewhere. It is sufficient to show the principles at work, and to obtain the answer needed to proceed.
It should be clear that gravitational fields do not have any fundamental connection with consciousness. The gravitational forces that are at work in the one place about which we have first hand experience of consciousness, namely, in the brain, and specifically acting between the individual neurons and synapses that are responsible for the data handling that we are conscious of, are of trivial magnitude in comparison to the gravitational forces between these objects and, say, the moon or the planets. Since we are not primarily consciousness of the moon and planets in their orbits, but of the data being processed by the electrochemical processes of the brain, it should be clear that consciousness, that consciousness that we experience during our waking moments, does not have gravitational forces as its interface to the physical world.
However, based on this argument, it might seem that consciousness must be connected to the physical world by means of the electromagnetic processes described by the fundamental equations that underlie all electrochemical processes. The problem with this argument lies in the fact that electromagnetic forces, and, as a consequence, the electrochemical processes in the brain, would include too much. Only a very small part of the overall electrochemical activity of the body is involved in the chemical events that have to do with the data processing that goes on in the brain. There is far more electrochemical activity in the simple chemical synthesis that produces heat and proteins in the body than is involved in the neural activity immediately involved in data handling by the brain. Moreover, even for the electrochemical activity within synapses, only a part of that activity is tied immediately to the processes of synaptic firing, and only a portion of the information handling of all the synapses seems to be consciously experienced. Most of the neural and synaptic activity of the brain appears to be involved with the vast data handling needed to support pattern recognition, and the like, that we do not experience immediately as it is going on, but only as the product of that processing that is "handed over" to the conscious experience (we experience the seeing of a horse, for example, but we are not conscious of the vast data processing needed to single out that image from the background data and distinguish it from a being another cow, or a dog).
Because of this line of argument, we are left with only the last of these possibilities, namely, that consciousness is somehow tied to some quantum mechanical process that is associated with the brain's functioning, and more specifically with synaptic activity, as that is where the data handling of the brain actually takes place.
1.3.5 Quantum Mechanics Application to Consciousness
Interestingly, our line of reasoning given above that leads to the so-called state vector of quantum mechanics as the physical construct for consciousness interaction/interface with physical phenomena is a viable choice for entirely other reasons. All the other constructs in the physical equations are thoroughly specified as to their physical role. This is true to such an extent that it would be extremely difficult to fit into these other constructs additional phenomenology In the case of quantum mechanics, and the nature of the state vector (or wave function), the situation is entirely different. Almost from its inception, there has existed a controversy that fully parallels the mind/body controversy. It is called the "measurement problem." The measurement problem in quantum mechanics exists because of the peculiar fact that the Schrödinger equation, on which the formalism is based, does not give one deterministic solution, but gives a collection of possibilities - probabilistic potentialities, with no physical mechanism whereby one of these potentialities can actually occur. Since on observation, i.e., measurement, we know that one of the potential states has occurred, it has become the convention to say that "state vector collapse" (or "wave function reduction") happens on measurement, a euphemism for "conscious observation." As a result, the question of the involvement of consciousness in quantum processes arises on its own in quantum theory, and the incompleteness of the understanding of what, physically, is the nature of this state vector leaves us not only with the unresolved measurement problem, but it promises us a clue as to how there can exist something that could fulfill the requirements needed to have a physical construct that would interface with something "nonphysical." The state vector itself is something so peculiar as to its nature that it is already difficult to accommodate within our usual understanding of what physical reality is, anyway. It provides us ready made an avenue into the realm of nonphysical constructs that the study of consciousness needs.
Having said all that, we still require that quantum mechanics must be shown to play an essential role in the functioning of the brain having to do with the stream of data that we consciously experience. More specifically, it is necessary that there be a quantum process at work in the operation of the brain involved in the data handling processes of the central nervous system. Since it is generally taken to be the case that the data handling operations of the brain occur at synaptic junctions, it is necessary for us to show that some quantum mechanical process is involved in the functioning of synapses, and is involved in an essential way.
1.3.5.1 Quantum Mechanical ‘Tunneling' at the Synaptic Cleft
The basic characteristic of the synapse is that it serves to interrupt or to facilitate neural impulse propagation from neuron to neuron by means of processes that take place at the synaptic cleft. Because one of the distinctive quantum processes is "quantum mechanical tunneling" that permits a particle to jump otherwise impenetrable barriers, it is reasonable to consider the possibility that the quantum process involved in synaptic functioning across the cleft is quantum tunneling. The question is, "Is this a viable process?"
It has been shown that using values for the barrier taken from neurophysiological data for the synapses, one can compute the size of the synaptic cleft that would be necessary for electrons to be able to tunnel across the cleft with a probability corresponding to the probability for nominal central nervous system (CNS) synapses to fire when an action potential arrives. The result of 180 Angstroms corresponds exactly to what is found for CNS synapses. The point is that electron tunneling under these circumstances must occur.
Further, there is a class of synapses, called ephapses or electrical synapses, that fire electrically rather than by chemical release. These ephapses are morphologically identical to the synapses in all respects except one: their clefts are about 150 Angstroms wide. Calculations show that reducing the thickness of the cleft from 180 Angstroms to 150 Angstroms changes the electrical behavior of the synapse in just the fashion found experimentally in data that has been collected for these kinds of neurophysiological structures.
To put this hypothesis on a firm footing, however, requires that the full functioning of the synapse as a quantum mechanical tunneling mechanism that controls neurochemical release be analyzed mathematically and fully modeled. This means that the effects of thermal processes, and depolarization-hyperpolarizing effects on the chemical quantal release that causes miniature endplate potentials (MEPP) must be included. This has been accomplished using exact, closed form equations.
1.3.5.1 The Calcium Hypothesis
The calcium hypothesis remains, however, the basis of almost all work in neurophysiology despite its severe limitations. Little or no attention has been paid to the quantum mechanical tunneling theory cited. The reason is likely due not only to the complexity of the quantum theory for people in neurophysiology, but the fact that except for the consciousness question, there seems outwardly to be little reason to be driven to the quantum hypothesis. In almost every way, the electron tunneling process seems to give evidence of its existence only in the subtle details of the current-voltage relationship that exists in any device in which it operates. To a great extent, neurophysiologists can get nearly the same results assuming ionic resistive electrical behavior of the synaptic elements, provided one is not too concerned with exact precision in accounting for the various processes at work, and as long as one does not look too closely at the energetics driving the firing process in synapses. Ultimately, whatever role the calcium ions play, vesicle release must be controlled by the energetics available from the 70 mV across the synaptic membrane on the arrival of the action potential - and those energetics are controlled ultimately by electrons.
A critical examination of the calcium hypothesis shows that it continues to have severe limitations. Any critical examination of the calcium hypothesis literature will show that the hypothesis stands largely on the fact that experimental introduction of calcium ions into the presynapse results in the firing of the synapse. A quantitative look at this data, however, shows that this is entirely explainable by the fact that the amount of Ca++ introduced in these experiments is sufficient to depolarize the presynapse. The synapse should fire when depolarized. That it does when depolarized, does not tell us what the mechanism of that firing is, regardless of what ions are used to produce the depolarization.
The following further remarks should be made about the calcium hypothesis:
1. Any theory of synaptic transmission should help to explain the peculiar morphology that exists at the synaptic cleft, and the calcium hypothesis does not do this. In the case of the quantum mechanical tunneling theory, one is forced to propose that the synaptic cleft is about 180 Angstoms in thickness, and that there must exist patches of macromolecules aligned perpendicular to the cleft facing each other on either side of the cleft - structure that is present in all synapses. Thus, the electron tunneling theory of synaptic transmission starts out with the right morphology, while the calcium hypothesis never accounts for this morphology.
2. Objections to the calcium hypothesis already in the literature at the time the quantum tunneling theory was proposed, namely those of Hubbard <1970> and Remler <1973), have never been adequately answered.[P> 3. A detailed theoretical paper based on the calcium hypothesis dealing with transmitter release and synaptic facilitation as analyzed by Fogelson and Zucker <1985> points to several problems with the calcium hypothesis, and shows that such modeling remains severely limited:
(i) The model given treats only the currents; these currents are constrained by the Na-K pumps of the normal Hodgkin-Huxley neural impulse propagation mechanism operating throughout the neuron, and are therefore dominated by that process. Little deviation from the bounds controlled by those pumps is even possible, so that the results have little meaning. <The modeling of this aspect of the problem, therefore, is much less relevant than the data handled by the quantum tunneling theory of synaptic functioning. There, note, all the data having to do with the functioning of the synapse has been covered and satisfied.>
(ii) The fit of experimental data to the paper's theoretical curves is not satisfactory.
(iii) The model has several arbitrarily adjustable coefficients.
(iv) 3-D modeling is introduced to improve the poor results of the 2-D calculations. <Generally, one goes to the 3-D model to finish up the precision of a model. When, as here, it is brought in to fix a bad fit, it is often the mark of a bad theory being adjusted by the introduction of additional adjustable coefficients.>
This does not mean that the calcium ions play no role in synaptic transmission, but it does say that that role is probably secondary, and that the calcium hypothesis, taken alone, has turned out to be less than satisfactory in explaining all experimental data.
The Quantum Mechanical theory of synaptic functioning, on the other hand satisfies the following experimentally established facts about synaptic functioning:
1. Synaptic cleft thickness: As mentioned above, for the energy available at the synapse, 70 meV, and materials of which it consists, quantum mechanics supports tunneling with the probability corresponding to the firing probability for CNS synapses only for distances on the order of 180 Angstroms. Synapses of the CNS have clefts of 180 Angstroms.
2. Morphology of synapses: For quantum mechanical tunneling to cause synaptic firing, patches of donor and acceptor molecules must face each other across the synaptic cleft. Such structures occur commonly in all CNS synapses.
3. Unified theory of synapse-ephapse junctions: Morphologically, synapses and ephapses are identical, except for the thinner clefts present in the ephapse. The quantum mechanical tunneling theory accounts for this morphological/functional difference.
4. Cleft thickness/conductivity of the ephapse: The detailed electrical properties of the ephapse can be calculated using the theory.
5. Energy involved in spontaneous vesicle release in mammalian synapses: The energy expended in vesicle release has been measured and agrees with the theoretical value.
6. Energy involved in spontaneous vesicle release in amphibian synapses: The energy expended in vesicle release in amphibians differs slightly from that in mammals; it has been measured, and the measured value agrees with the theoretical value.
7. MEPP frequency as a function of hyperpolarization and depolarization: The average rate of MEPPs is accounted for quantitatively for both hyperpolarization and depolarization driving potentials applied across the synaptic cleft.
8. MEPP frequency variability: Most hyperpolarization-depolarization curves are linear; others are not. Variations in both kind and in magnitude are accounted for by the quantum mechanical tunneling theory.
9. Osmotic pressure effects: Addition of solutes alters the osmotic pressure in synapses, causing changes in the MEPP frequency. The quantum mechanical tunneling theory accounts for these effects both qualitatively and quantitatively.
10. Functional relationships between vesicle release probability and delay time: Depolarization of the synaptic cleft leads to MEPP quantal events (vesicle release). The time-delay probability distribution is accounted for by the quantum mechanical tunneling theory.
11. Temperature effect on time delay for vesicle release: The effect of temperature on the vesicle-release probability versus time-delay function is accounted for by the quantum mechanical tunneling theory.
These results are obtained with no arbitrarily adjustable coefficients. The constants that do appear in the derivations are at most fine-tuned, but always as based on limits imposed by the materials and physics involved. These results provide firm evidence that the quantum mechanical tunneling theory is valid.
1.3.6 Quantum Mechanical Interconnection of Synaptic Functions
Clearly, even if one brings quantum mechanical processes into the essential functioning of the synapse, that still does not provide us with a theory of consciousness. This is merely a first step. Since our conscious experience is one integrated whole, a whole that combines and integrates data events from synapses distributed throughout the brain, it is necessary that there be a process that integrates these events into one quantum mechanical whole - so that there is one state vector that incorporates the potentialities of the various possible firings of the synapses interconnected at any moment.
One of the nice things about the electron tunneling theory of synaptic functioning for consciousness theory is that the tunneling phenomenon is a quantum process that is essential to the synaptic data handling event. In addition, as we discuss below, it turns out to be easy to resolve the problem of the last paragraph - of getting an integrated subset of the brain 5 synaptic activity involved in an overall quantum process. This is achieved by means of the "hopping conduction." However, it is important to realize that despite the fact that we have argued that having a quantum mechanical process involved in the functioning of the synapse is essential to achieving a theory of consciousness, just getting quantum mechanics into the synapse is not sufficient for the establishment of a theory of consciousness. It is also essential that we show how these quantum processes that play a role in the functioning of individual synapses ties these synapses together so that the information they handle can become an integrated (quantum mechanically coupled) conscious whole.
It is usually thought that it is the neural net that integrates the synapses into one whole, but the difficulty with this is that this interaction is entirely describable in classical terms, as has been shown by the very successful Hodgkin-Huxley theory of neural impulse propagation. That process involves only one classically described state at any one time, whereas the hallmark of quantum processes is that there exist potentialities, "probabilities," as represented by the state vector. As a result, the fact that we have a viable quantum process present at the synaptic cleft is just our starting point in the development of a theory of consciousness. We have to find the quantum mechanical process that provides the interconnection among the synapses, an interaction or connectivity that is itself quantum mechanical and that interconnectivity must be functional - it must serve some purpose in bringing about synaptic functioning.
In view of this last statement, it is clear that there must exist some means whereby the potential to fire at one active synapse can be passed to another remote synapse by means of quantum mechanical tunneling. Since quantum mechanical tunneling is difficult even for electrons over any but the smallest distances, the only way in which this process can occur in the brief times available - the 0.3 to 3 milliseconds involved in typical synaptic firing - is by means of a very large number of very short tunneling hops. Calculations show that for hops over distances of only about 100 Angstroms, these jumps can happen in times as short as a few picoseconds - allowing several hundred billion jumps each second. If these hops take place between some "stepping stone" material distributed throughout the brain, such as the 31 grams of soluble RNA molecules in the brain, then the jumps will only have to be about 100 Angstroms each. It is clear that for jumps of 100 Angstroms taking place at a rate of about one hundred billion per second (with a characteristic jumping time t' = 8.4x10^(-12) s <note t' stands for Greek tau>) and continuing for about 0.3 milliseconds, an electron can cover distances that span the brain. In so doing, such an electron can deliver the energy of 0.07 eV (corresponding to the bias potential across a neuron, or at the synaptic cleft) that it carries, so as to facilitate conformational changes in macromolecules that comprise the gates for vesicle chemical content release, and firing of the distant synapse.
For this to be possible, a number of conditions must be met. Most important is the condition that there will be both donor synapses, synapses that contribute electrons to make possible a transfer of energy to fire a synapse, and synapses available to receive the energy in that brief time.
Assume that there are N synapses in the brain. Actual numbers for this quantity have been obtained both by examining brain sections from sites throughout the brain, and by means of homogenization of brain material with sampling counts being made on the result. The resulting value is about N = 2.35x10^13. We will also take it that there are in each synapse n macromolecules that can contribute electrons to fire either the vesicle gate immediately across the synaptic cleft from it, or that of some other synaptic gate in another distant synapse, if the tunneling of the electron can arrive at that synapse during the time that both synapses are active and electrically polarized (meaning that the donor and receiver molecules are at 70 mV potential difference).
Values for n are not difficult to obtain. For a nominal one micron diameter synapse having about 10% of the synaptic cleft covered with these proteolipid macromolecules, long cylindrical molecules having a diameter of about 7 Angstroms, n = 200,000, approximately. Additionally, we will take for the time during which the synapse remains active to be the average time after the arrival of an action potential, but before firing, t = 0.3 milliseconds, a value easily obtained experimentally. The time for the electron to hop from one RNA molecule to the next, t', is 8.4x10^(-12) s, as already given.
Using these quantities, it is easily shown that in order for the process to be sustained, that is to say, in order for there to be a polarized synapse that has been reached by one of the electrons that can bring about synaptic firing, the following condition must be met:
Nt^2Nf/Mt' (]or =) 1 (1)
where f is the firing frequency for the typical synapse. This condition, Eq. (1), has obtained by taking the product of the following five quantities:
1. The number of synapses that are active (about to fire) at the same time as the donor synapse.
2. The chance that any particular donor electrons will be on one of the n donor molecules in another active synapse.
3. The number of donor electrons traveling out from the donor synapse.
4. The number of hops each electron can make during the time the donor synapse is active.
which gives us the "coupling factor" Q for a donor synapse. This is then multiplied by:
5. The chance that given the above coupling, the receiver synapse will fire, i.e., we multiply by 1/n.
This then gives us Eq. (1).
Given that the size of the average soluble RNA molecule in the brain is about 25,000 Daltons, and that there is 31 grams of soluble RNA in the brain, it is easy to obtain the value of M as being 7.45x10^20. Experimental measurements on various animals, as well as experiments on humans let us obtain a value for f both under the conditions of sleep and while awake For the waking state, the value is about f = 0.027 per second, which satisfies Eq. (1). During sleep, the value of f drops to 0.009 per second, which fails to satisfy Eq. (1), as we should expect, this being, in effect, a condition on the occurrence of consciousness <Walker, 1979>.
It is instructive to express this condition as an equation for the minimum synaptic firing rate that will allow this process to be self sustaining.
We have from Eq. (1):
f(min) = Mt'/nNt^2 (2)
Note that here, even though it was not our intention, we have obtained an equation for the onset of consciousness. The computed value is 0.014 per second as against an experimental median value of 0.018 per second.
1.3.7 The Consciousness Data Rate ‘C'
It is at this point easy to obtain another fundamental characteristic of consciousness, a quantity that gives us a measure of the amount of data that passes through the consciousness each second, the consciousness data rate, C. The "coupling factor" mentioned above gives us the number of synapses that interact together at any moment. Multiplying that factor, Q, by the amount of information i carried by each synapse when it decides to either fire or not to fire, and then dividing by the time required form the synapse to fire, t, gives the information data rate for the consciousness:
C = in^2tNf/M (3)
The value of i is somewhat difficult to evaluate accurately. The value would be simply unity, one bit handled every time an action potential arrived at the presynapse, if the neural system optimally encoded information. However, it does not. It appears that impulse trains are an important part of the functioning of the brain, and as a result there is a lot of redundancy in the handling of data. This may be due in part to the fact that thermal disturbance of the quantum firing process must be eliminated through this redundancy, as is found in the modeling of the quantum tunneling mechanism for the synapse. In any event, the value of i has been calculated elsewhere. The value is i = 0.0293 bits of information per activation event.
Using this value of i, we obtain for the consciousness data handling capacity (not, mind you, the rate of actual information, but the information channel capacity),
C = 47.5 Mbits/s (4)
To understand just how good this number is, one should consider that this Is very close to the channel capacity, or bandwidth, necessary to carry the information for multimedia systems designed to fill an audience with the experience of realism. Such systems typically have channel capacities in the range of 100 Mbits/s.
A further important point to notice in favor of this theory of consciousness is that it accounts for the fact that most of the data handling processes carried on in the brain are not consciously perceived. Only about a hundredth of a percent of all the brain's activity is so experienced.
As a result, it is clear that the theory provides strong experimental support for its validity.
1.3.8 The RNA Aspect
The theory, as given, is quite robust. Most of the things assumed are things that can easily be shown to be present in the neurophysiologyr, or that must occur, given the physics and the morphology that is present. Perhaps the one aspect of the theory that does deserve further comment has to do with the assumption that soluble RNA plays the role of supporting the hopping conduction of the electrons. Hopping conduction is an established conduction mechanism, and under the conditions present in the brain, RNA molecules should be able to support electron hopping. Because of the uncertainty principle, energy levels for temporary electron attachment need not be an exact match to the energy carried by the electrons. Moreover, most of the energy levels present in macromolecules are quite broad bands, readily enabling the brief attachment of an electron during the hopping conduction process. The similarity of these RNA molecules to the proteolipid molecules that are the donor molecules at the synaptic cleft further argues for the likelihood that the energy range of these bands is that required for electron hopping conduction.
The selection of soluble RNA molecules as the electron carriers for the hopping conduction process, however, was originally made for the purpose of providing concrete calculations for the theory - to demonstrate that the physics would be consistent with the assumptions made. The calculations resulting from this selection made it clear that the overall process was viable. However, it would seem that the evolution of the brain might make use of a more organized structure for the coupling of synapses immediately involved in eliciting consciousness. There may exist other molecules that play the role of electron transport, including the molecules of the microtubules discussed by Hammeroff. However, it has not been established that these can transport electrons, or that they have available energy bands that would be available for the purpose. It should be mentioned parenthetically, however, that the derivation given originally for the quantum theory of consciousness made use of expressions slightly different from those given here, equations more suited to the assumption of a microtubule structure within the brain, though this point was not discussed at that time.
There is one reason, however, to suggest that the RNA molecules have an advantage. That is that they could be tailored to store information, information that would be available to synapses irrespective of location. Such information would be stored in terms of the detailed energy levels present due to the structure of the molecules. Present information, however, is not adequate to evaluate this possibility.
1.3.8 Other Theories - Similar but Different Approach
There are other theories of consciousness, but to cover them all would take more space than is available here. One that should be mentioned, however, is the Penrose-Hammeroff quantum gravity/microtubule theory.
1.3.8.1 Penrose-Hammeroff Quantum Gravity/Microtubule
This theory envisions that quantum ground state vibrations of microtubules are tied to the mechanism of state vector collapse, and that it is the "activation" of this mechanism of state vector collapse that couples the brain to consciousness. The Schrödinger equation, of course, is well known to generate solutions that require for any quantum system the existence at any instant of time a simultaneous collection of potentialities, as opposed to a single state, as would be the description for any classical system. Penrose suggests that gravitational differences between the various potential states drives the system to collapse to one of the allowed states when observed. Added to this hypothesis is the fact that an observer, a person or animal, having these microtubules that may be disturbed by the observation of the quantum system, will have slightly different gravitational states, and these gravitational disturbances they believe drive the Schrödinger equation to collapse to one state by means of a term in the Schrödinger, a new term Penrose adds to alter the Schrödinger equation.
There are difficulties with this suggestion. Probably most important is the fact that this kind of modified Schrödinger equation has been tried before in many variations, with various means and terms to bring about the disturbance needed for state vector collapse. They have always suffered from the difficulty that they either cannot bring about collapse fast enough, or if fast enough, then these modifications alter the energetics of the Schrödinger equation so much that the added term leads to incorrect predictions readily noticeable in experiments already done.
This problem does not mar the present quantum theory of consciousness1 because the theory does not rest on the collapse of the state vector to provide a basis for consciousness. In the present theory consciousness occurs because of the multiplicity of the states given by the state vector, Y<please read Greek psi>. Nevertheless, the problem of state vector collapse is a problem that must be solved. An approach to the problem that solves the difficulty noted above has been suggested in a paper on information measures in quantum mechanics. Over and above this difficulty is the obvious problem with the Penrose-Hammeroff theory. What we would all be conscious of, were this theory true, would be the "Music of the Spheres," and not the firing of synapses in our brains. That is where the energetics predominate. Finally, these authors have not derived results from their theory that provide adequate explanations of, or quantitative results consistent with the experimental data for consciousness phenomena.
1.3.8.2 Stapp Quantum Wave Dispersion of Calcium Ions
Stapp's ideas regarding consciousness are rather different from those of Penrose and Hammeroff, and in fact are much closer to those given here. We seem to have agreement that quantum mechanics must play a direct role in synaptic processes. There are differences having to do with the neurophysiological mechanism for this, however. Stapp has suggested that the quantum wave dispersion of the calcium ions may account for the introduction of quantum mechanics into the description of brain states, and he attaches consciousness to that quantum process. Clearly, quantum state dispersion is at the root of the consciousness associated with brain functioning.
"There is no need to assume that there exists a ground state quantum process having quantum coherence" as is necessary, for example, to account for superconductivity.
Now, if calcium ion wave function spread can cause dispersion in the vector representing the state of the brain - representing the state of the brain's data content - then this suggestion has to be considered seriously as the basis of consciousness, or as a contributing cause. If so, then several things should be checked. One of these is the question as to whether or not there exists an electric potential about calcium attachment sites that could serve to attract calcium ions within range of those centers. If the calcium ion is to be attached to either the synaptic membrane, as in the calcium hypothesis, or to the vesicle gates, as in the electron tunneling theory, then in either case there will be a binding energy of the order of 0.1 to 1 eV. This would mean that there would be an electric field that would extend on the order of 10 to 100 Angstroms to pull in these calcium ions. The field could fairly quickly sweep up the calcium ions, wave function and all, and in doing so, remove the quantum dispersion. Questions of this nature will have to be addressed before the calcium hypothesis will be able to contribute anything to an understanding of consciousness.
1.3.8.3 Crick Hypothesis of Forty Hertz
One theory of consciousness promoted by Francis Crick <1994>, is the Hypothesis of Forty Hertz, whereby the "binding problem" of conscious phenomena is addressed. Crick reduces the problem of the occurrence of consciousness to identifying consciousness with the firing of neurons. But this raises problems understanding how spatially separated neuronal firings can give rise to an integrated experience of consciousness. Crick and his colleague Christof Koch suggest that it is the synchronous neuronal firing reported by Singer <1995> that provides the needed "binding." Searle <1997> discussing the adequacy of such a theory of consciousness says, "Suppose it turned out that consciousness is invariably associated with neuron firing rates of 40 hertz in neuronal circuits connecting the thalamus to the cortex. Would that be an explanation of consciousness?" He answers that question, emphatically, "No." Such a correlation is not an explanation as to how consciousness arises.
Nevertheless, this synchronous firing, firing at about 40 hertz, but ranging from as low as 35 to as high as 75 hertz, is a correlate of consciousness, and is, in fact, just the base or background firing activity needed to sustain the quantum process described here when the brain is otherwise relatively inactive. Note that the 35 to 75 hertz range corresponds to a cycle time of f = 0.028 per second to f = 0.013 per second, covering nicely the range of values discussed above as being necessary to sustain consciousness. The real hard problem binding, however, comes about from the quantum tunneling processes at work between the active synapses in these neurons. It is one of the singular characteristics of quantum mechanics that a quantum system cannot be analyzed in the reductionist fashion. Note: the whole quantum system has to be analyzed as one entity using the formalism of the wave equation that gives a wave function description for the total system. All the firing synapses coupled by the tunneling become one entity as a result of this quantum mechanical process. This happens to such an extent that separate electrons involved in the tunneling lose their separate identity, something known in quantum theory by the term indistinguishability.
1.3.9 Conclusions
Look at all that we have achieved here. With only the assumption that quantum mechanics must play a role in conscious integration, we have a theory for synaptic functioning that is superior to the "calcium hypothesis," as noted above. We have a theory that explains the morphology of synapses, and that gives the correct values of the synaptic and the ephaptic cleft. Moreover, with just the intention to test whether the conditions in the brain are suitable to satisfy the requirements for long-range synaptic interaction, we find not only that it is satisfied, but that the theory itself insists that consciousness must be an onset phenomenon. In order for consciousness to occur in association with the brain's activity, the level of activity of synapses must transition from that prevailing during sleep to that during waking consciousness.
Both consciousness onset (sleep to wake transition) and consciousness associated with a subset of neural activity (consciousness/subconsciousness division) fall out of the electron tunneling theory, and give quantitative results consistent with experimental data, with no further assumptions. Thus, the theory demands that the transition from sleep to consciousness occur and have the onset suddenness characteristic so a part of conscious experience. In addition, we can see how the 40-hertz "binding" comes into play.
We should note that the same derivation used to test these characteristics of the theory, and of consciousness also provide the equation for the consciousness data rate, the "stream of consciousness," that has always been recognized as a basic characteristic of consciousness.
If we apply these theories of consciousness, such that is based on the application of quantum mechanical electron tunneling effects that occur at synaptic clefts, we can gives the rationale for the introduction of quantum mechanics into the consciousness problem, and shows how this leads to quantitative results in agreement with experiment. Thus by development and application of specialized equipment, the ‘travel of consciousness through a temporal rift' may be quite possible.
